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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff /Respondent

vs.
WENDELL IRVING HILL,

Case No. 18180

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Wendell Irving Hill, was convicted in a
criminal proceeding of one count of Aggravatated Burglary, a
felony of the fist degree, one count of Aggravated Robbery, a
felony of the first degree, one count of Theft, a felony of the
second degree, and one count of Aggravated Assault, a felony of
the third degree, before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, on
December 2, 1981, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Wendell Irving Hill was tried and convicted of the
above counts, and sentence on December 10, 1981, to an indeterminate sentence as provided by law at the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by the
Court below, and a new trial, or in the alternative that the case
be remanded for resentencing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues to be raised on appeal
are that on or about October 7, 1981, at the Stratford Hotel
located at 169 East 200 South in Salt Lake City, Utah, the apartment of Richard Salamone, manager of the Stratford Hotel, was
entered by two men, one of whom was armed with an automatic pistol.
Salamone and a guest, John Savage, were subsequently bound.

The

two men threatened Salamone and Savage; taking money from the
manager's desk and personal property belonging to Salamone before
leaving the apartment.

Aprroximately five to ten minutes later

appellant and co-defendant were stopped in co-defendant Paul
Miller's car, some two and one-half to three blocks from the
Stratford Hotel.

Found in the trunk of the car, upon impound,

were all items of personal property reported missing by Salamone.
A television set was in possession of appellant in the front seat
of the car.

At appellant's trial, appellant testified that he

had had a prior relationship with Salamone, and that the items
taken from the apartment that evening had been won by him from
Salamone in a series of card games.

Also found in appellant's

possession at the time of his arrest was a .20 caliber pistol,
which appellant testified that he had also won from Salamone.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THEFT IS A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
The standard for determining when an offense is a lesser
included offense is set out by statutue in Section 76-l-402(3)(a),
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), which provides:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the
included offense. An offense is so included
when: (a) It i.s established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged. . .
This court set out the requirements for an included
offense in State v. Brennan, 371 P.2d 27 (Ut. 1962) as follows:
The rules as to when one offense is included
in another is that the greater offense includes
a lesser oneiwhen establishment of the greater
would necessarily include proof of all of the
elements necessary to prove the lesser. Conversely, it is only when the proof of the lesser
offense requires some element not involved in
the greater offense that the lesser would not
be an included offense.
Both theft and robbery are crimes of larceny, both
requiring the union of an act with the intent to permanently
deprive another of his property by otaining unauthorized control
over it.

The common law in this state and in other jurisdictions

has long required the presence of "animus furundi," or intent
to steal as an essential element of the offenses of theft and
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and robbery.

People v. Hughes, 39 P. 492 (Ut. 1895); People v.

Gallegoes, 2 F 4P.2d 608 (Colo. 1954); State v. Hardin, 406 P.2d
466 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Brighter, 608 P.2d 855 (Haw. 1980);
Richardson v. U.S., 403 F.2d 574 (N.C. Cir. 1968).
Professors W. LaFave and A. Scott state the connnon law
as follows:
Robbery consists of all six [common] elements
of larceny . . . plus two additional requirements: (1) that the property be taken from the
person or presence of the other and (2) that
the taking be accomplished by means of force
or putting in fear. Handbook on Criminal Law
§94 (1972) at 692.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the compound nature
of robbery in dismissing a verdict of guilty on a conviction of
grand larceny where the appellant was also convicted of the crime
of robbery.

This, on the basis that, the grand larceny charge

was a lesser-included offense.

State v. Donovan, 294 P. 1108

(1931); State v. Montagne, 474 P.2d 958 (1966).
In the recent case of State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75
(1981) this court reversed, inter alia, a conviction for aggravated
robbery, where the instruction did not adequately state the requirement of specific intent for the offense of aggravated robbery.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion focused on the inadequacy
occasioned by the failure of the instructions to reflect the
elements of the crime of aggravated robbery; stating:
The instructions were worded in the statutory
language, but in this case, that was not
sufficient. The instructions do not require
the jury to find that the taking which occurs
in a robbery must be with the intent to deprive.
627 P.2d at 80.
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Justice Stewart further noted that the 1973 amendment
to Section 76-6-301, U.C. Ann. (1953), wherein "felonious taking"
was changed to an "unlawful and intentional taking:"
. . . did not change that element of the crime
requiring an intent to deprive which has
always accompanied the crime of robbery. See
People v. Hughes 11Utah100, 39 P.492 (1895).
627 P.Zd at 0.
The Nevada Supreme Court in reversing a conviction of
first-degree nurder for failure to instruct the jury as to
specific intent in a charge of robbery held, in Turner v. State,
605 P.2d 1140 (Nev. 1980):

Although the statute is silent regarding intent,
this court has held that the "taking in the
crime of robbery must be with the specific
intent permanently to deprive the owner of his
property." State v. Sala, 63 Nev. 270, 169 P.2d
524 (1946). And, we note that instructions
regarding the specific intent required for
robbery were given in Brimmage v. State. 93 Nev.
434, 567 P.2d 54 (1977); and Rofers v. State,
83 Nev. 376, 432 P.2d 331 (1967 . 605 P.Zd
at 1141.
During the trial in the instant case, the judge conceded
that theft appeared to be a lesser included offense of robbery
(T. 199).

The trial court, however, found that aggravated robbery

does not have the element of intent to deprive the owner (T. 29).
On

the basis of s.tate v. Potter, supra, and prior case law,

appellant contends that this ruling is erroneous.
At trial the prosectuion relied on the peculiar treatment
of aggravated robbery in as much as Section 76-6-302(3), U.C. Ann.
(1953 as amended), is inclusive of an attempt to, commission of,
or immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
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On the face of the statute and in light of State v. Potter, supra,
there is nothing in the expansion of the actus rea that changes
the mens rea requirement of this crime.
The attempt statute, Section 76-4-101, U.C. Ann. (1953
as amended), requires a person to " [act] with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the offense."

Sub-part

(2) of the attempt statute requires that for conduct to constitute
a substantial step, it must be strongly corroborative of the
actor's intent to commit the offense.

If the actor's conduct does not corroborate an intent to
deprive in the aggravated robbery situation, then there is no
attempted robbery or theft, but rather evidence of assault or
aggravated assault.

See State v. Dugan, 608 P.2d, 771 (Ariz.

(1980).
That there is no legislative intent to change the mens
rea requirement of aggravated robbery

i~

further illustrated by

the retention of the statute under offenses against property, and
not offenses against persons.
Appellant does not deny that the enhanced penalty for
aggravated robbery is directed at the danger created by the risk
of, or actual occurance of bodily injury, to the victim.

Clearly,

the definition of "in the course of robbery" is aimed at this
risk, to the victim, which is equally great either before, during
or following the course of an aggravated robbery.

See People v.

Wells, 592 P.2d 1321 Colo. 1979).
Appellant further contends that in the instant case the
legislative intent in the creation of the more serious crime of

-6-
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aggravated robbery meets the legislator's

penal objectives unless

there are legislative indications to the contrary.

Here, there

was one criminal episode made up of a continuous flow of conduct
with one objective sought.

Therefore, where the imposition of a

greater punishment is provided for in the greater offense, the
statute is inclusive of the lesser.

State v. Cloutier, 596 P.2d

1278 (Or. 1979).
POINT II
WHERE ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADINGS, THE SAME
COURSE OF CONDUCT IS ALLEGED FOR BOTH OFFENSES,
IT IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO CHARGE BOTH THE
GREATER AND THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.
Section 76-1-402(3), U.C. Ann. (1953 as amended) provides
that a defendant may be convicted of an included offense or the
greater, but not both.
Reason dictates, that where a defendant may not be convicted
and punished for both the greater and the lesser offense, it is unfair
and prejudicial to charge both separatly were on the fact of the
pleadings the prosecution alleges the same conduct for both crimes.
In the instant case, count II of the Information, Aggravated
Robbery, alleges in the statutory language the crime charged, and
further that the defendant(s):
. . . took personal property in the possession
of Richard Salomone, against his will, and in
the course of committing said robbery, said
defendant(s) used a firearm . . .
In count III, Theft, the Information alleges in the
statutory language the crime charged, and further that the
defendant(s):

-7-
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. . . obtained and exerc·ised unauthorized control
over the property of Richard Salamone with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, from the
person of Richard Salamone and said defendant(s)
were then and there armed with a deadly weapon,
to-wit: a firearm" . " (emphasis added).
On the face of the Information the prosecution charged
appellant with the greater and the lesser offenses.

Proof of the

allegations in count II of the Information would also have been
proof of ·count III, as alleged.
Either count is inclusive of both counts, under either
the "statutory theory" where one offense is the lesser under the
statuto-ry definition, or the "pleading theory,n where an offense
is an included offense if it is alleged in the Information as a
means or element of the commission of the

h~gher

offense.

See

Section 76-1-102 (3) (a), U. C. Ann. q._9.5J_ as . -ame~4}:~;.~_State v.
Washington ;-=-S-43 --p ..-gd 1058 ·, 1062 (Qr. -197 ~); State
:r._:-?cr-9-7_cl_J_~d~ho l_~_OJ_;:_ __People

V_..__

Thompson, -6-14

v. -Lobbauer, 627 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1981).

The instant case illustrates the fairness to both the
defendant and

~he

prosecution of using the specific accusatory

pleading as a yardstick for charging purposes.

-The prosecution

may thereby anticipate that evidence at trial might develop in
such a fashion that only the lesser included offense should be
presented to the jury.

Further, the defendant is put on notice

that he should be prepared to defend against the allegations as
made in the Information, including the lesser offense, People v.
Marshall, 309 P.2d 456 (Cal. 1957).
-8-
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Appellant contends that he was prejudiced in the instant
case by "charge stacking."

Several federal circuits have focused

on the impropriety of charging both the lesser and the greater
in different counts.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Howard, 507 P.2d
559 (8th Cir. 1974) held that not only was it improper to convict
a defendant of both a major offense and a lesser included offense
arising out of the same facts, but it was improper to charge the
defendant with both crimes.

To hold otherwise would result in

"charge stacking" which would be prejudicial to-the defendant.
In Drew v. United States, 331 P.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
defendant was charged with robbery and attempted robbery.

The

court set out the argument against the multiple charges faced
by defendant.

Referring to the defendant, the court stated that

he may be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons:
(1) he may become embarassed or confounded
in presenting separate defenses;
(2) the jury may use the evidence of one of
the crimes charged to inf er a criminal
disposition on the part of the defendant
from which is found his guilt of the other
crime or crimes charged; or
(3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of
the various crimes charged and find guilt
when, if considered separtely, it would not
so find. Id. at 88.

The court continued:
A less tangible, but
element of prejudice
feeling of hostility
of several crimes as
Id. at 88.

perhaps equally persuasive
may reside in a latent
engendered by the charging
distinct from only one.

The above arguments against multiple charges are of
particular importance in the instant action.

-9-

A jury may look
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at the stacked charges and feel hostility or prejudice towards the
defendant for a fictitious propensity to commit multiple offenses
when clearly only aggravted robbery is really at issue.

For this

reason alone, the charge of the lesser included offense of
aggravated assault sho.uld have been dropped and only the aggravated
robbery charge pursued.

POINT III
.THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE FOR BOTH AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY AND THEFT ARISING OUT OF A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE WAS ERROR.
In the instant case, appellant has been sentenced and is
presently· serving time for both the greater and the lesser included
offenses that he was charged with in separate counts.
Section 76-1-402(3) U.C. Ann. (1953 as amended) is
dipositive of this issue.

Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d llOF (Ut. 1975).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons appellant respectfully requests
that his sentence be vacated and a new trial ordered on the charge
of aggravated robbery, or in the alternative that the case be
remanded for sentencing consistent with a conviction for the charge
of aggravated robbery alone.

,,\
Reispectfully submitted,
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BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the

foregoing Brief to the Attorney ~eneral, 236 State Captiol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this

~

day of

, 1982.
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